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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, sales tax enactment has often coincided with eco-
nomic depression or war.1 For this reason, sales taxes are sometimes
called "children of despair."2 It is no accident, for example, that in the
United States many of the states first adopted a retail sales tax during
the Great Depression of the 1930s.3 I believe that a radical change in
Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. Prepared for
Presentation at the SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ISSUES AND IDEAS IN
MULTISTATE TAXATION: OLD DLEamAs/NEw APPROACHES; Washington D.C.;
October 10, 1991; Sponsored by The Multistate Tax Commission.
1. BEN TERRA, SALES TAXATION: THE CASE OF VALUE ADDED TAX iN THE EUROPEAN
COMmUNITY 3 (1988).
2. Id. This phrase is of German origin (Kinder der Not). Id.
3. Id at 4. (citing JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MKESELL, SALES TAXATION, STATE AND
LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 2 (1983)). Forty-five states levy a retail
sales tax. See John A. Miller, State Administration of a National Sales Tax: A
New Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 9 VA. TAX REV. 243, 247 n.16
(1989). In the absence of some calamity, there is likely to be significant public
outcry against major sales tax increases. Consider, for example, what happened
in Florida a few years ago when it sought to introduce sweeping tax reforms into
its sales tax, including the taxation of many previously exempt services. Within a
few months of enactment, a beleaguered Governor and Legislature caved in to
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the method of state sales taxation, such as a shift from a retail sales
tax (RST) to a European style value added tax (VAT), will only occur
in the face of great calamity. This is part of the politics of taxation.
Should circumstances conspire to create great need to dramatically
increase state revenues, a switch to the VAT from the RST may seem
appropriate. Whether such a change would truly be appropriate is de-
batable.4 While many points concerning the relative merits of the
VAT and the RST could be raised, the central issues in that debate
would be whether the VAT is superior to the RST in its ability to tax
services, whether the VAT is more easily enforced than the RST, and
whether the VAT is superior to the RST in avoiding "cascading." Cas-
cading is the phenomena in sales taxation of having tax levied upon
tax.
In addition to the major issues just mentioned, state enactment of a
VAT would raise at least two other significant questions that combine
political and technical concerns. First, how would a state VAT handle
interstate sales? In particular, would a state VAT assist in resolving a
state's problems with sales taxation of mail order sales? Second, how
would enactment of state VATs impact the federal tax system? In par-
ticular, would state VATs increase or decrease the likelihood of the
enactment of a federal sales tax?
Before addressing the questions just raised, it would be useful to
consider the economic incidence of both forms of sales taxation and
the structural differences between the RST and the VAT.
opposition groups and repealed the new tax provisions. The political scars may
take years to heal. See Jon Mills, The 1987 Legislative Session, 15 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 607, 607.09 (1987); Vicki L. Weber, Florida' Fleeting Sales Tax on Services,
15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 613, 613 n.1, 663-65 (1987); Edward P. Jones, Florida Politi-
cians Demoralized After Repeal of Services Tax, 38 TAX NOTES 91 (1988); Florida
Lawmakers Repeal Tax on Services, Raise Sales Tax Rate, 37 TAX NOTES 1150
(1987). More recently, Massachussetts went through a similar experience. See
Tom Moccia, Lawmakers Repeal Sales Tax on Business Services, 50 TAX NOTES
1273 (1991).
4. For a sampling of opinions as to the relative merits of these two forms of sales
taxation, see TERRA, supra note 1, ch. XI; Charles E. McLure, Jr., State and
Local Implications of a Federal Value-Added Tax, 38 TAX NOTES 1517, 1520
(1988); VALuE ADDED TAx: A MODEL STATUTE AND COMMENTARY, A REPORT OF
THE COMMIUTTEE ON VALUE ADDED TAX OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SEC-
TION OF TAXATION 6 (Alan Schenk, reporter 1989) [hereinafter ABA MODEL
STATUTE]; Sijbren Cnossen, VAT and RST A Comparison, 35 CAN. TAX J. 559
(1987); John F. Due, The Choice Between a Value-Added Tax and a Retail Sales
Tax, in CONFERENCE REPORT 16:1 (Can. Tax Found. 1985); Malcolm Gillis, Excis-
ing Excises: Federal Sales Tax Reform in Canada, in CONFERENCE REPORT 460,
473 (Can. Tax Found. 1984); and Stanley S. Surrey, A Value-Added Tax for the
United States-A Negative View, in TAX PoLicY AND TAX REFORm: 1961-1969,
SELECTED SPEECHES AND TESTIMONY OF STANLEY S. SURREY 475, 485 (William F.
Hellmuth & Oliver Oldman eds., 1973) (A speech given in February of 1968).
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II. THE STRUCTURE AND INCIDENCE OF THE TWO TAXES
Both the RST and the VAT are general consumption taxes. That
is, they are broad based excise taxes on the sale of property or services
to the final consumer. The final consumer is sometimes referred to as
the non-entrepreneurial consumer 5 because, on the theoretical level,
the consumption sought to be taxed is personal consumption rather
than entrepreneurial consumption.
The fundamental difference between the American retail sales tax
and the European value added tax is structural. The RST is a single
stage tax, and the VAT is a multistage tax. The RST is collected in one
fell swoop from the ultimate consumer at the retail sale level. The
VAT is collected at every stage from manufacture to final
consumption.6
Without knowing more, one might be tempted to assume that the
VAT is not a true consumption tax because it is collected on non-retail
as well as retail sales. However, the typical VAT employs a credit sys-
tem that prevents the entrepreneurial buyer from suffering any loss
due to the tax. Ultimately, the full legal incidence of the tax falls
upon the non-entrepreneurial consumer. Basically, the noncumula-
tive, multistage, credit VAT works as follows: At each stage of produc-
tion, the selling entrepreneur collects the VAT as a set percentage of
the sales price; the selling entrepreneur deducts the VAT she had paid
for her materials from the VAT she collects from her buyer and remits
the excess to the government; similarly, when her buyer resells the
product or service, he (the buyer) deducts the VAT paid to his seller
from the VAT he (the buyer) collects from his buyer before remitting
the excess; and so it goes until there is a non-entrepreneurial purchase
that carries with it no entitlement to deduct the VAT collected from
the purchaser. Thus, the non-entrepreneur buyer bears the full
weight of the tax to the same extent as under a RST regime.7
Who actually bears the economic burden of the sales tax (whether
VAT or RST) is a matter of debate. The general theory is that the
consumer bears the burden. However, some have argued persuasively
that this view is too simplistic, and that the ultimate economic burden
falls, in part, on entrepreneurs or on labor.8 As noted above, both the
5. See TERRA, supra note 1, ch. 11.2.
6. Id. at ch. IV.
7. For a detailed discussion of the nature and character of the VAT, see id. at ch. V.
A model credit method VAT statute has been developed by a committee of the
American Bar Association. See ABA MODEL STATUTE, supra note 4.
8. See TERRA, supra note 1, ch 11.3; Cliff Massa III & David G. Raboy, The Canadian
Value-Added Tax: Does Anybody Care?, 45 TAx NOTES 481, 485-88 (1989); DANIEL
C. MORGAN, RFrAIL SALES TAX, 4-5, ch. VI (1964); See also Norman B. Ture, The
Basic Economics of a United States VAT, 6 J. CORP. L. 49, 56 (1980); Charles
Waldauer, Economic Effects of the Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, 6 J. CORP. L.
[Vol. 71:192
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RST and the VAT are designed to have the non-entrepreneur con-
sumer pay the tax. The question is whether the tax creates an incen-
tive for the seller to reduce the price charged to the consumer in order
to indirectly bear some of the economic burden of the tax. If the tax is
levied across the board on all similar products, the entrepreneur has
less reason to reduce his price in order to absorb some of the tax.
Since all of his competitors must also collect the tax, the seller is at no
competitive disadvantage by collecting the full tax from his customer.
However, if similar products are treated differently, some products be-
ing taxed and some not being taxed, the retailer whose product is
taxed may feel obliged to bear some of the tax in order to compete
with the untaxed products. From a tax theory perspective, of course, a
system that taxes similar products differently is undesirable.9 It is
generally preferable that any form of taxation should be economically
neutral. That is, the tax should not affect economic decisions.1O
It is commonly asserted that the VAT differs from the RST in form
but not in substance.l However, some commentators believe that the
acknowledged difference in form has important implications with re-
spect to administrative efficiency, the ability to tax services, and the
ability to avoid cascading. If these commentators are correct, the dif-
ferences in form will lead to substantive differences in coverage, reve-
nue raising capability, and market neutrality between the two taxes.
To further develop this point, each matter is separately analyzed be-
low beginning with the issue of cascading.
III. AVOIDING THE CASCADE
Suppose we have a broad based sales tax that applies to both prop-
103,106,110 (1980); CLARA K. SULLIVAN, THE TAX ON VALUE ADDED, ch. 7 (1965);
NEiL H. JACOBY, RETAIL SALES TAXATION, ch. XI (1938).
9. "Standard economic theory assumes that the market achieves an optimal alloca-
tion of resources. Given this assumption, it follows that sales taxes should be
neutral in their impact on the market; that is, they should not distort the eco-
nomic behaviour of producers and consumers." Cnossen, supra note 4, at 576-77.
10. James M. Bicldey, The Value-Added Tax: Concepts, Issues, and Experience, 47
TAX NoTEs 447, 455 (1990).
11. See Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place in
the Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207, 226 (1987); U.S. DEP'T. OF THE
TREASURY, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, 3 THE
TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 62 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter
TREASURY REPORT]. See also Paul R. McDaniel, A Value Added Tax for the
United States? Some Preliminary Reflections, 6 J. CORP. L. 15, 16 (1980). Cnos-
sen puts it more carefully than I have when he says ". . . given equal coverage and
tax rates, VAT and RST are identical in their economic effects and in the distribu-
tion of their respective tax burdens." Cnossen, supra note 4, at 574. As will be
discussed, Cnossen is of the opinion that the VAT is better able to tax services,
and thus, its coverage is typically broader than the RST. This means that in prac-
tice one of the "givens" set out in his assertion is unlikely to be met.
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erty and service transfers. If a lawyer buys paper on which to record
someone's will, the law could require her to pay sales tax on the paper
when she purchases it. If so, her charge to her client will include not
only the cost of the paper on which the will is recorded, but also the
sales tax she paid when she bought the paper. If a sales tax is then
imposed on the fee the lawyer charges her client, part of the sales tax
collected on the fee will represent sales tax on the sales tax paid at the
time she purchased the paper. This is the cascade effect. Cascading is
considered an undesirable trait in a sales tax because it introduces
competitive distortions into the economy.' 2
Both the RST and the VAT have mechanisms for avoiding the cas-
cade effect. The structure of the European style credit method VAT is
specifically designed to avoid cascading even when services are part of
the tax base. Because each entrepreneur recoups (by means of the
credit) the tax he paid, he need not include the VAT he paid into his
selling price in order to maintain his profit margin.13 Thus, a five per-
cent credit method VAT will collect no more tax than a five percent
tax levied only on the final sale in the production chain. In the hypo-
thetical case of the lawyer and her paper, the lawyer need not add the
sales tax paid on the purchase of the paper to her bill because she will
recoup the tax from the VAT she collects from her client. Thus, no
tax is collected on tax.
Some cascading is common in RST jurisdictions, 14 but in theory
this need not be the case. To the extent the RST avoids cascading, the
avoidance is achieved primarily by the mechanism of the resale certifi-
cate. In the case of the lawyer, for instance, she may be given written
authority by the Revenue Agency to purchase items for resale without
paying sales tax. As long as the buyer is purchasing products for re-
sale, no retail sales tax applies and no potential for cascading exists. A
12. For a discussion of the competitive distortions caused by cumulative cascades, see
TERRA, supra note 1, ch. IV.3.1. Cumulative cascading will tend to favor verti-
cally integrated businesses because the shorter the production and distribution
chain, the less tax burden on the business. It also favors labor intensive busi-
nesses over capital intensive businesses because capital is taxed but wages are not.
Perhaps most importantly, cascading causes sales tax to become embedded in the
product in such a way that the tax cannot be removed when goods are exported.
This causes such goods to be less competitive in the external market. See idi See
also Sijbren Cnossen, Consumption Taxes and International Competitiveness:
The OECD Experience, 52 TAX NoTEs 1211,1212-13 (1991); Bickley, supra note 10,
at 456-7 (describing how the VAT maintains external neutrality).
13. By allowing each entrepreneur a credit against the VAT he collects equal to the
amount of the VAT he paid, the only tax actually imposed at each stage is for the
value added at that stage, hence the name of the tax. Cumulatively, that amount
will equal the VAT rate applied to the retail sale price.
14. Most RST jurisdictions accept some cascading by taxing some entrepreneurial
purchases of capital goods. For instance, the retailer may pay sales tax on all of
her purchases of office equipment and furniture. See Cnossen, supra note 4, at
601.
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difficulty arises, however, when the entrepreneur purchases items of
which he is the final consumer. For example, suppose the lawyer buys
a computer disk on which she records the client's will. Should such
purchases be subject to tax? From one perspective those purchases
should not be taxable since they were made in an entrepreneurial ca-
pacity. They are not true retail sales. Yet, literally speaking, the disk
was purchased by its ultimate consumer, the lawyer. Thus, from a dif-
ferent perspective the sales tax should apply. However, if the sale of
the computer disk is taxed, the lawyer will pass the tax along in her
bill to the client. Thus, when the sales tax is imposed on the lawyer's
fee, the cascade effect will occur; tax will be imposed on tax.
One solution to this problem is to indulge in the legal fiction that
the lawyer is buying the computer disk in order to resell it.15 Thus,
the lawyer would be permitted to use her resale certificate to purchase
the computer disk free of sales tax. Alternatively, the sales tax stat-
ute could be written to exempt all entrepreneurial purchases includ-
ing those in which the entrepreneur is the final consumer of the item
or service purchased. However, this solution to the cascade effect
would continue to create problems in determining when the RST
should apply and when it should not. For example, if the lawyer pro-
vides services to a business entrepreneur, should the lawyer collect
the RST on her fee or should her fee be treated as a sale for resale?
The answer will depend on the entrepreneur's purpose in consulting
the lawyer. If the purpose is business related, no RST should be col-
lected. If the purpose is personal, the RST should be collected. Thus,
the RST will always require some inquiry into the buyer's motive for
the purchase in order to determine whether the sale is taxable.
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the avoidance of cascading
in the case of the RST can seem more forced than in the case of the
VAT. The fact remains, however, that both forms of taxation can be
structured to avoid the problem of tax on tax. Thus, the choice be-
tween the two forms should not be determined solely by the potential
for cascading. Perhaps it could be said that the VAT is ahead on points
with respect to the cascade effect.6
15. In a metaphorical sense, the lawyer is buying the disk to resell it, ie., she is using
it in service of her client rather than in her personal service. Thus, the legal
fiction of allowing the lawyer to use her resale certificate to avoid tax on the
purchase can be justified. After all, the lawyer will include the cost of the disk in
her bill to the client. Thus, ultimately the client will indirectly pay sales tax on
the lawyer's purchase of the disk.
16. Professor Due appears to accept this view. See Due, supra note 4, at 16:6-7. In-
deed, he concedes that as a practical matter cascading is quite prevalent in RST
jurisdictions because entrepreneurial purchases are commonly taxed. Id-
1992]
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IV. TAXATION OF SERVICES
Generally speaking, a sales tax should apply to sales of services as
well as to sales of goods. There are two primary reasons for this. The
first reason is revenue. By adding services to the sales tax base, much
more revenue can be produced with the same rate of tax.17 Thus, tax-
ation of services allows the sales tax rate to remain relatively low.
Second, taxation of services can partially relieve the regressive charac-
ter of the sales tax since services tend to be purchased to a greater
extent by higher income individuals.18 A third reason sometimes of-
fered for taxing services is to avoid competitive distortions. For exam-
ple, if the tax is levied upon the sale of washing machines but not upon
the sale of laundry services, there is introduced into the economy a
competitive advantage to laundry service providers over washing
machine sellers.19
In this country, many services, such as advertising, legal, and medi-
cal services, traditionally have not been subject to RST. However,
there is no inherent or structural reason why the RST cannot or
should not apply to services. For instance, in the case described in the
discussion of the cascade effect concerning the lawyer who provides
her client with a will, computation of the sales tax is a simple matter
of applying a rate, say five percent, to the amount of the lawyer's fee.20
The only change required in the traditional state sales tax in order
to tax most services in an appropriate manner would be the need to
exclude all of the lawyer's purchases from sales taxation in order to
avoid the cascade effect. As noted above, this could be done by al-
lowing the lawyer to treat all of her purchases as if they were
purchases for resale.
In a sense, the extension of the sales tax to services would repre-
sent a simplification of the RST because such extension would justify
exempting all entrepreneurial purchases from taxation. Under the
current regime of taxing sales of goods but not sales of services, 21 it is
necessary to tax entrepreneurial purchases that do not lead to a sale
subject to tax (as when the lawyer buys paper and then uses it to pro-
duce a will which is not subject to tax). An RST that applies uni-
formly to services and goods does not need to tax entrepreneurial
17. Cnossen asserts that "services outside distribution easily comprise half of GDP in
industrialized countries." Cnossen, supra note 4, at 594.
18. TERRA, supra note 1, ch. XIII.2.1. Cnossen, supra note 4, at 595-96. However, the
sales tax remains essentially a regressive tax.
19. See TERRA, supra note 1, ch. II.2 (where this example is set out).
20. Certainly many difficult questions would arise in taxing services. For example,
taxation of interstate advertising is a much more difficult proposition than my
example.
21. Most states do tax at least some services, but the coverage is not generally
pervasive.
[Vol. 71:192
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purchases even when the entrepreneur is nominally the ultimate con-
sumer because the end transaction between the entrepreneur and the
non-entrepreneur is always taxed. However, as revealed by the exam-
ple of the lawyer who provides a service to another entrepreneur, the
RST always involves the need to distinguish between entrepreneurial
and non-entrepreneurial sales if the cascade effect is to be avoided.
Distinguishing between taxable and non-taxable sales can be difficult,
and the need to do so exposes the system to potential abuse. 22
The VAT is well adapted to taxing sales of services. The credit
mechanism works just as well for the service entrepreneur as for the
goods entrepreneur. In each case, the entrepreneur pays VAT on his
purchases and collects it on his sales, remitting only the excess of what
he collects over what he paid to the Treasury. Indeed, one might say
the VAT is specifically designed to tax everything, goods and services
alike. In particular, unlike the RST, there is no need to distinguish
between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial sales because the
VAT is imposed on every sale. When it comes to taxing services, again
it might be said that the VAT is ahead of the RST on points.23
V. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY
It is sometimes argued that one of the chief advantages of the VAT
is that its form makes it easier to enforce than a RST.24 Because each
entrepreneur is required to keep accurate records of the VAT he paid
in order to get credit against the VAT he collects, he has an economic
incentive against dealing with his suppliers and customers "off the
books." Moreover, the record chain that is built up under the VAT
system is thought to make evasion more detectable by audit.25 The
value of these administrative aspects of the VAT is not beyond dis-
pute,26 but it is probably correct to say that the VAT offers an enforce-
ment advantage over the RST. However, sales tax audits (whether
VAT or RST) are expensive and extremely labor intensive. Substan-
tial voluntary compliance is necessary for any sales tax to work
smoothly.
It is arguable that voluntary compliance with the RST is easier
than with the VAT because there are fewer collecting points. How-
22. See Cnossen, supra note 4, at 597.
23. It is not clear to me that Professor Due would concede this. See Due, supra note
4, at 16:7-8. He seems more inclined to believe that the two taxes are equally
adaptable to taxation of services. I&i Cnossen and Terra both hold the opinion
that the VAT is superior in its handling of taxation of services. See Cnossen,
supra note 4, at 597; TERRA, supra note 1, ch. XIII.2.1.
24. Due, supra note 4, at 16:3; TERRA, supra note 1, ch. XIII.2.1, XIII.3.
25. Due, supra note 4, at 16:3-4; Cnossen, supra note 4, at 581.
26. Professor Due, in particular, contends that these arguments in favor of the VAT
are overrated. See Due, supra note 4, at 16:4.
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ever, only in a nominal sense is all the tax collected at the retail level
in a RST system. In fact, wholesalers and manufacturers are often
part of the RST collection network. Their records must sometimes be
examined to properly calculate a retailer's liability, and many, if not
all of them will have some direct sales or use tax liability of their own.
For instance, a gasoline refiner will purchase unrefined oil free of
RST because it is a manufacturer. It may consume some of the oil in
its operations and, thus, incur a use tax liability. It may also sell fuel
directly to ultimate consumers such as airlines or fishing fleets, thus
subjecting itself to tax liability as a retailer. Admittedly, this assumes
that entrepreneurial consumption is subject to the RST. It was sug-
gested previously that on a theoretical level such consumption should
not be taxed. A broad based RST that taxes sales of both goods and
services should exclude all entrepreneurial purchases in order to
avoid the cascade effect. However, the fact remains that en-
trepreneurial purchases are commonly taxed under most RST re-
gimes. Consequently, most manufacturers and wholesalers are likely
to have sales or use tax liabilities.
Another debatable administrative advantage of the RST over the
VAT is its handling of exemptions. Sales tax exemptions have proven
prolific in most states. 27 Exemptions create more complications in a
VAT than in an RST because they must be "carried, almost of neces-
sity, through all levels of production and distribution."28 Thus, a VAT
system that incorporates a large number of exemptions could be ad-
ministratively complex. However, it has been suggested that the com-
plicating effects of exemptions on the VAT may tend to discourage the
enactment of exemptions under a VAT regime.29 Thus, the VAT's un-
wieldiness with respect to exemptions could be seen as an advantage if
one believes that exemptions in a sales tax are generally
undesirable.30
The necessity for distinguishing between entrepreneurial and non-
entrepreneurial purchases has already been alluded to as one of the
administrative problems of the RST. If a person buys a truckload of
27. See DUE AmD MIKESELL, supra note 3, ch. 3.
28. Due, supra note 4, at 16:7.
29. I&
30. Most commentators believe the avoidance of exemptions and differing rates to be
highly preferable despite the implications this may have for regressivity. See, e.g.,
TERRA, supra note 1, ch. VI.3.; Cnossen, supra note 4, at 607-09. The obvious ad-
vantage of permitting few or no exemptions is that revenue needs can be met
with a lower rate of tax. To illustrate the point, one need only point to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 which dropped the top individual income tax marginal rate
from 50% to 28%. The Act was designed to be revenue neutral. As mentioned in
the text, exemptions also create complexity.
It might be noted that a commonly suggested solution for the VAT's regressiv-
ity is some form of direct rebate to low income persons. See, e.g., TERRA, supra
note 1, ch. VI.3.
[Vol. 71:192
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gravel from a quarry in order to cover the driveway at his home, the
RST should apply to the sale. If that same person buys a truckload of
gravel from the same quarry in order to make concrete blocks for re-
sale, the RST should not apply to the sale. How is the quarry to know
whether to collect RST on the sale of any given truckload of gravel?
To some extent, the quarry is simply obliged to take the buyer's word
as to his intentions. If the buyer shows the seller his resale certificate
issued by the taxing authority, the seller is unlikely to collect the tax.
Thus, the RST is inherently susceptible to complexity and abuse.
The VAT system does not call for the exercise of discretion by the
seller in collection of the tax. The seller must always collect the tax.
Thus, the onus is on the buyer to establish that he is entitled to a
credit for the VAT he paid against the VAT he subsequently collects
from his buyer.3 ' In this way the VAT avoids the significant danger of
cascading while also limiting its exposure to the potential for complex-
ity and abuse that discretionary judgments about collection entail.
One of the chief enforceability comparisons between the VAT and
the RST involves interstate sales. That issue is left for the next sec-
tion of this article. However, leaving aside the issue of interstate sales,
it can reasonably be said that the VAT is structurally superior to the
RST from an enforcement perspective due to the lack of discretion the
VAT permits in the collection of the tax. This structural advantage is
particularly important if one wishes to include most services in the tax
base.
VI. INTERSTATE SALES
A controlling principle in interstate sales taxation in this country is
the Destination Principle.32 By this it is meant that when goods are
sold in interstate commerce, the sales tax applicable to the transaction
is that of the state of destination rather than the sales tax of the state
of origin. (The reverse of the Destination Principle is aptly referred to
as the Origin Principle.) This assumes a true interstate sale where
title or possession passes to the buyer in the state of destination. For
sales tax purposes, a sale is intrastate if it is completed in the seller's
state of residence even though the purchase may have been made for
31. See Cnossen, supra note 4, at 581. He asserts that this is a significant enforcement
advantage of the VAT over the RST.
32. This term is used because it has a certain universal meaning. See TERRA, supra
note 1,] ch. II.4. In a broad context the Destination Principle taxes goods where
they are consumed. Id It is employed in the EC VAT system. Ia at ch. IX.3.1.
Whether a product is "consumed" in one state or another may be a close question,
but in this context "consumed" simply refers to the place where the taxable event
takes place. Terra's discussion of the concept of "consumption" gives it a mean-
ing which is quite compatible with our method of levying sales taxes in the state
where the transaction is completed. See I& at ch. 11.3. See also Cnossen, supra
note 4, at 579.
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the purpose of using the goods in another state.33
The Destination Principle may be seen as a natural concomitant to
the limits of state sovereignty. Sales that take place beyond the state's
border are beyond the state's ability to tax.3 4 This creates an obvious
tax incentive for residents in sales tax states to make their purchases
in non-sales tax states. Hence the need for a use tax as an enforce-
ment mechanism for the sales tax.35 The importance of the use tax
has diminished as sales taxes have become more prevalent because
most states allow a credit against their use tax for sales tax properly
paid to another state.3 6 Thus, if a taxpayer makes a purchase in a state
with a four percent sales tax and brings the item into a state which
levies a five percent sales and use tax, he is liable for only the one
percent difference in rate between the first state's sales tax and the
second state's use tax. The utility of the use tax has always been se-
verely circumscribed by the practical difficulties of administering it,
but National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the State of
JllinoiS37 served to greatly exacerbate those practical difficulties.
In National Bellas Hess the Supreme Court ruled that Illinois
lacked the authority to require an out-of-state company to collect illi-
nois use tax on a mail order sale to an Illinois resident. Whether Con-
gress has the power to overturn the Court's decision is a matter of
some debate.38 This debate stems from the ambiguous wording of the
Court's opinion39 which leaves it unclear whether the result rested on
33. State Tax Comm'n v. Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 372 U.S. 605 (1963); Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944). This com-
ports with the meaning of "consumption" in sales tax law. See supra note 32.
34. But this view is subject to challenge. See infra notes 47 and 48.
35. See DuE AND MIKESEUL, supra note 3, at 245.
36. Id. at 247.
37. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
38. See, eg., Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987 and the Equity in Interstate
Competition Act of 1987. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 75-76,
143-44 (1988)(statement of Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Professor of Law, University of
Texas School of Law and statement of Jerome R. Hellerstein, Adjunct Professor,
New York University School of Law).
39. In his majority opinion Justice Stewart wrote, .... the test whether a particular
state exaction is such as to invade the exclusive authority of Congress to regulate
trade between the States, and the test for a State's compliance with the require-
ments of due process in this area are similar." National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. De-
partment of Revenue of the State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). He went on
to discuss the facts of the case in relation to both due process and interstate com-
merce legal principles without ever specifying the ultimate foundation for the
result reached. In the end though, the Court implied that Congress possesses the
authority to change the result when it said, "[t]he very purpose of the Commerce
Clause was to ensure a national economy free from such unjustifiable local entan-
glements. Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the
power of regulation and control." Id. at 760.
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the Due Process Clause40 or the Commerce Clause4l. If the decision
rested on the former, then Congress presumably is powerless to
change the result. But, if the decision rested on the Commerce
Clause, then Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce is
plainly sufficient to overrule the result in National Bellas Hess. As an
aside, it might be noted that a recent Supreme Court decision indi-
cated that National Bellas Hess rested on the Commerce Clause.42
If the ruling paradigm in state taxation of interstate sales is the
Destination Principle, then National Bellas Hess must be seen as aber-
rational. From a sales tax theory perspective, the decision in National
Bellas Hess should be overruled since the decision distorts the market
by giving mail order companies a competitive advantage over local
sellers of the same or similar products.43 The states have a strong in-
terest in seeing the decision overturned44 since it is extremely imprac-
tical for them to collect the use tax on mail order sales directly from
consumers. This impracticality stems from the fact that the needed
assessment information is not available to the states,45 and, even if it
were available, a great deal of administrative inconvenience would be
involved in collecting the usually small tax liabilities from such a large
pool of taxpayers. Over time, the states have sought to minimize the
significance of National Bellas Hess, and there is some uncertainty
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. D. H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988).
43. Whether constitutional principles support such an outcome is another matter. As
a rule of thumb, we might say that the Commerce Clause should not be applied to
defeat non-discriminatory state taxes. Since state sales taxes are uniform in their
application to resident and non-resident sellers, one could argue that there is no
compelling reason to give the non-resident sellers exempt status (and the result-
ing competitive advantage that exempt status conveys). The dormant Commerce
Clause, it has been cogently argued, simply forbids states from engaging in pur-
poseful protectionism. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Pro-
tectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv.
1091, 1093 (1986). Though Professor Regan was writing about what he called
"movement of goods cases," perhaps the same logic could be made to apply to
state sales taxation of interstate sales in a manner consistent with the Destination
Principle.
44. It has been estimated that, nationally, state revenue losses from untaxed mail
order sales are in excess of $1.5 billion annually. Progress Reported in Negotia-
tions on Mail Order Sales Tax Bill, 80 DTR G-3, 4 (3-1-88).
45. The same barrier which prevents the states from collecting the tax from the mail
order companies also prevents them from auditing the mail order houses' records.
The statute in issue in National Bellas Hess not only imposed an obligation to
collect and remit the Illinois use tax, it also required recordkeeping and submis-
sion to necessary "investigations, hearings, and examinations". National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 755
(1967). Though the Court did not specify, it seems clear that when it released
National Bellas Hess from the obligation to collect the tax, it also released it from
the other burdens imposed by the statute in issue.
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about its continued vitality.46
If National Bellas Hess is not overruled, then perhaps, as has been
suggested,47 the states in which the mail order companies reside could
attempt to apply their own sales taxes to these interstate sales.48 It
would be anomalous if one class of retail sales was immune from sales
taxation in both the state of origin and the state of destination.49 Even
so, application of the Origin Principle to interstate sales is undesirable
since such an approach invites competitive distortions by taxing goods
destined for export and conflicts with the essential nature of the sales
tax as a tax upon consumption. The Destination Principle is the logi-
cal standard to adopt. It effectively frees exports of tax and taxes im-
ports at the rate equivalent to the rate on competing domestic goods.
This external neutrality of the Destination Principle is a major vir-
tue.5 0 Constitutional considerations aside, the Destination Principle
makes sense for purposes of state sales taxation.5 1
Both the VAT and the RST are suited to the Destination Principle.
In theory, the RST is destination based since it is collected at the final
point in the sales chain. However, since most RSTs permit some cas-
cading, such as by taxing entrepreneurial purchases of capital goods, it
is probable that exports from an RST jurisdiction are not entirely free
of tax.5 2 This means that those exports will be at a competitive disad-
46. Recently, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has concluded that National Bel-
las Hess has lost much of its significance. See North Dakota v. Quill Corp., No.
900257, slip op. (May 7, 1991). For commentary on this decision, see Maryann B.
Gall, Commentary: The Nexus Wars, 69 TAXES 541 (Sept. 1991); James H. Peters,
Why Nexus?, 1 STATE TAX NOTES 77 (Sept. 16, 1991). The U.S. Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in the Quill case. See Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Wil-
,,am Wrigley, Jr., Co., 1991 U.S. Lexis 4777, 60 U.S.L.W. 3257 (Oct. 7, 1991).
47. Michael F. Baccash, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-Can a State Consti-
tutionally Levy Its Sales Tax on an "Interstate Sale"?, 3 N.Y.U. INST. ON ST. AND
Loc. TAX'N § 1.01, 1-5 (1985).
48. Baccash contends that application of the four prong test in Complete Auto
Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), will validate taxation of interstate sales
by the state of origin if credit is allowed for sales or use tax paid in the state of
destination. See Baccash, supra note 47, at 1-21 to 1-25.
49. Of course National Bellas Hess involved simply requiring the seller to collect the
use tax owed by its buyer, but it is implicit in such an approach that the more
direct route of collecting the sales tax from the seller was unavailable to the
State.
50. TERRA, supra note 1, ch. 111.3. A retail sales tax is also neutral in its impact on
internal competition (as compared with a cumulative, multistage sales tax) since
the RST falls equally upon goods produced under integrated and non-integrated
conditions. 1d.; ALBERT J. ROBINSON, THE RETAIL SALES TAX IN CANADA 33 (Can.
Tax Paper No. 77, 1986). However, since not all purchases by entrepreneurs are
exempt from most RSTs, some cascading of tax does occur.
51. For an analysis of the applicability of the Destination Principle in a federal VAT
context, see Sijbren Cnossen, The Irrelevance of the Restricted Origin Principle,
20 TAX NOTES 521 (1983).
52. Cnossen, supra note 4, at 602.
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vantage vis-a-vis similar goods produced in a jurisdiction where such
cascading is avoided.53 Still, one may say that for the most part the
RST allows exports to leave the origin state free of tax.
The VAT's compliance with the Destination Principle takes a dif-
ferent form from the compliance of the RST. This is because the mul-
tistage structure of the VAT means that exports will almost certainly
have been subjected to some tax prior to shipment out of state. Thus,
the VAT's compliance with the Destination Principle requires that the
tax collected on goods and services prior to their export must be re-
funded, or some other mechanism must be found for freeing the goods
from domestic VAT.M In the context of our federal system, refunds
are the most likely approach unless we posit a scenario under which a
large number of states all adopt a VAT within a short time of one an-
other. In the event of multiple adoptions of the VAT, it is conceivable
that some sort of clearinghouse system could be adopted in the form of
an interstate compact.5
Such a clearinghouse system would avoid the necessity for refunds
to the exporter by allowing him to deduct the VAT he paid from the
VAT he collects (even though the VAT he paid was remitted to the
exporting state's treasury and the VAT he collects is remitted to the
importing state's treasury). Instead of making refunds to exporters,
the exporting state would credit the account of the import state in the
amount of the tax it collected prior to export.
A simple example will serve to illustrate the clearinghouse system.
Suppose Exporter Alpha, located in California, makes a sale to Buyer
Beta, located in Delaware. Suppose further that Alpha had previously
paid forty dollars of VAT on its product when it purchased that prod-
uct in California. Suppose also that the Delaware VAT applicable to
the sale to Beta is fifty dollars. Under the clearinghouse system, Al-
pha will collect the fifty dollar Delaware VAT but remit only ten dol-
lars to the Delaware treasury (the excess of the fifty dollars it
collected over the forty dollars it paid). Delaware will obtain the re-
maining forty dollars of the Delaware VAT from California.
Since it is likely states will be both importers and exporters with
respect to all other VAT states, actual cash payments would be mini-
mized. Instead, each state will receive or pay only the net difference
between the tax it collects on its exports and the tax it is owed on its
imports.5 6 Obviously, such a system would involve elaborate book-
keeping. Ideally, it would operate with a single central authority
53. 1&
54. Due, supra note 4, at 16:5.
55. For an early, seminal work concerning the Compact Clause, see Felix Frank-
furter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution: A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
56. Presumably, the accounts would be cleared by actual payment on an annual basis.
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keeping track of the balances in all of the states' accounts with one
another.
The interesting point about the clearinghouse approach, for pres-
ent purposes, is the potential it possesses for addressing the National
Bellas Hess problem. If an exporter can only recover the VAT he has
already paid by deducting it from the VAT he collects from his buyer,
then the mail order companies will have an economic incentive to col-
lect the tax from their out-of-state purchasers. Thus, the VAT holds
the potential for creating voluntary compliance among mail order
companies in the collection of the VAT on their out-of-state sales.57
To summarize this somewhat lengthy section, both the VAT and
the RST are largely compatible with the Destination Principle in the
context of interstate sales. The VAT is somewhat more complicated to
administer in the interstate sales context, but that complexity is man-
ageable. Neither form of sales tax offers any particular advantage
with respect to the neutrality problem posed by National Bellas Hess
unless the clearinghouse approach is adopted by those states employ-
ing the VAT. However, the clearinghouse approach holds out the po-
tential for voluntary compliance with the VAT by mail order
companies in order to obtain the indirect return of the VAT they paid
on their purchases.
VII. SPECULATIONS ON THE EFFECT OF STATE VATS ON
THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM
Whether the United States government will ever enact a broad
based sales tax is an open question.5 8 To a great extent, it depends on
The clearinghouse system is described by both Terra and Cnossen. See TERRA,
supra note 1, ch. XII.4; Cnossen, supra note 4, at 604.
57. I do not wish to oversell this idea. Another possibility is that the mail order com-
pany would simply add the VAT it paid to its retail price for its mail order goods.
Thus, it could recover the VAT without officially collecting it and, thereby, avoid
having any obligation to remit any tax to the destination state.
58. The desirability of Congressional enactment of a national sales tax has long been
a topic of debate. See Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption
Tax Have a Place in the Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REv. 207, 225 (1987);
Surrey, supra note 4, at 475. It is frequently considered for inclusion in the Con-
gressional tax agenda. See, e.g., Karin M. Skadden, 1989 Tax Agenda May Include
a Value-Added Tax, 38 TAX NOTES 547 (1988). See also Ellin Rosenthal, The 1989
Tax Debate: Consumption Taxes and Sacred Cows, 39 TAX NoTEs 1501 (1988).
There are a number of important policy issues bearing on the question of whether
such a tax should be enacted. For the moment the most prominent argument in
support of enactment is that a national sales tax is necessary if we are to elimi-
nate our persistent federal budget deficits. See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron, The Political
Economy of a Value-Added Tax in the United States, 38 TAX NOTEs 1111 (1988);
Koch Makes a Case for a National Value-Added Tax as a Revenue Enhancing
Measure, 37 TAX NoTEs 1205 (1987); Lee A. Sheppard, Why We Need a VAT, 34
TAX NoTES 529 (1987); Gerard M. Brannon, The Value Added Tax is a Good Util-
ity Infielder, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 303 (1984). This argument was being considered
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the condition of the U.S. economy. If the federal government does
enact a broad based sales tax, it will probably choose the VAT over the
RST. The works of John Due, Charles McLure, Sjibren Cnossen, Ben
Terra, Alan Schenk, and many others have laid the groundwork for
such an eventuality. Also, the tides of history presently run in favor
of the VAT. The recent enactments of VATs in Canada and Japan are
the most obvious indicators of this fact.59 This being true, what effect
would the adoption of VATs by the states have on the federal tax sys-
tem? One can posit at least two divergent scenarios.
It is possible that the states could head off the enactment of a fed-
eral VAT by staking out the VAT as their "tax turf." The states could
be perceived as saying to the federal government that broad based
sales taxation, whether VAT or RST, is their exclusive province. On
the other hand, numerous state adoptions of the VAT could lead to
widespread public acceptance of this hitherto little known form of tax-
ation. This, in turn, could pave the way for public acceptance of a fed-
eral VAT. Which of these scenarios is more likely? It is uncertain.
However, under either scenario the states would probably come out
ahead of where they would be if the federal government adopted a
VAT in an environment where there were no state VATs. This is be-
cause federal adoption of a VAT at a time when no state VATs exist
might make it more difficult for the states to enact VATs of their own
or even to enlarge the coverage of their existing RSTs.60
If state adoptions of the VAT prevent the federal government's en-
try into the field of sales taxation, the states will have saved their tax
turf. If the federal government adopts a VAT despite state adoptions
of a VAT, at least the states will be in position to assert their right to
continue to levy the tax in the face of possible preemption claims.6
Moreover, it is even possible that the states would be better suited to
even prior to the Reagan Era deficits. See Hugh Calkins, The Role of The Value
Added Tax in the Developing United States Tax System, 6 J. CoRP. L. 83, 101
(1980). But there are, of course, many points of debate regarding the wisdom of
such an enactment. See, ag., A Report of a Subcommittee of the Special Commit-
tee on Value Added Tax, Should the United States Adopt the Value Added Tax?-
A Survey of Policy Considerations and the Data Base, 26 TAx LAWYER 45 (1972);
Michael A. Schuyler, Consumption Taxes: Promises and Problems, 25 TAx NOTES
571 (1984). These include the regressivity of sales taxes, their potential for fueling
inflation, their role in encouraging savings and capital formation, and the possible
detrimental effects on state revenue raising capabilities of a national sales tax.
59. See Cnossen, supra note 12, at 1211. In all, twenty-one of the twenty-four mem-
bers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
have adopted VATs, and thirty-five countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa
have done the same. Id.
60. See McLure, supra note 4, at 1529-30.
61. I do not use preemption in a technical legal sense here. Instead, I use it to de-
scribe the possible resistance to enactment of a state VAT that a preexisting fed-
eral VAT might generate. See Id.
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administer the federal tax than would the federal government since
the states would already have a tax collection bureaucracy in place.62
Such a system would be analogous to that employed in the European
Community.6 3
VIII. CONCLUSION
On balance, the VAT is technically superior to the RST and is wor-
thy of adoption by the states. The VAT's superiority is relatively slight
with respect to any single aspect of the two taxes, but cumulatively
the clear advantage lies with the VAT. The VAT is better suited to
avoid cascading, it taxes services more easily, and it has a better en-
forcement scheme. In addition, widespread state adoption of the VAT
holds some promise for improving state taxation of interstate mail or-
der sales. This is because the clearinghouse method of collecting VAT
on interstate sales would give the mail order companies an economic
incentive to voluntarily collect the destination state's VAT. Finally,
state adoption of the VAT would tend to insure that the field of sales
taxation will remain subject to state sovereign control even if the fed-
eral government should later adopt a VAT.
From all this one might assume that I believe the states should
immediately switch from their retail sales taxes to a value added tax.
On a technical level this is probably correct. However, such a change
involves more than a technical question. The switch to a VAT would
impose the sales tax in new and unfamiliar ways and would arouse
public controversy. Providers and consumers of services, in particular,
might find the tax bite intolerable under a broad based VAT regime.
Thus, I conclude that state adoption of a value added tax is a desperate
act in search of the proper occasion. Sales taxes, after all, are children
of despair.
62. I have developed this idea at some length elsewhere and will not repeat myself
here. See Miller, supra note 3. Charles McLure has explored a variety of possible
arrangements for coordination of state and federal consumption taxes. See
McLure, supra note 4, at 1526-30.
63. Miller, supra note 3, at 247-48.
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